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Midnight rulemaking
and Congress
Nina Mendelson

I. Introduction
The 2008 presidential transition was accompanied by a familiar pattern
of midnight rulemaking. Shortly before leaving office, executive branch
agencies in the administration of President George W. Bush issued a host
of final rules, many on controversial subjects. In late November and December 2008 alone, the following rules, among others, were issued: The
Transportation Department, over criticism from safety advocates, lengthened the number of hours long-haul truck drivers could drive daily.1 The
Department of Health and Human Services issued its “conscience rule”
in late December, stating that a condition of federal funding for governments, hospitals, and other entities would be that those organizations accommodate an individual employee who refuses to participate in a health
service program or research activity contrary to his religious beliefs or
moral convictions.2 The rule was controversial not only because it could
limit access to abortion, but also to birth control and infertility treatment,
particularly in rural areas with few medical facilities. And the Interior Department issued two Endangered Species Act (ESA) rules: one limiting an
agency’s obligation to consult with the Interior Department prior to taking an action that could affect an endangered species or its habitat and the
other limiting the protections available for the polar bear, despite the department’s earlier declaration of the polar bear’s status as a “threatened”
species under the act.
This issuance by administrative agencies of significant, controversial
rules3 late in a presidential administration has become utterly typical of
presidential transitions. Such rules were issued by the outgoing Carter,
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Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations. Owing to
broad delegations of authority from Congress, the administrative state
is now a primary—perhaps the primary—engine of federal policy making, and it operates under the significant influence and even the direction
of the president.5 In the transition from one presidential administration
to another, an outgoing president can use the administrative state to entrench his preferred policy positions through actions that I have collectively termed “agency burrowing.”6 Administrative agencies might act in a
way that is relatively cumbersome for a new administration to reverse. The
highest-impact, most-difficult-to-reverse actions are probably notice-andcomment rules, which are typically broad, prospective, and have the force
of law. Once issued, these notice-and-comment rules may be revised or repealed only if the new administration conducts a new time– and resourceconsuming notice-and-comment proceeding and explains its reasons for
selecting a new position.7 Agencies also might hire or promote individuals
who are likely to share the president’s policy positions.8 Finally, these sorts
of actions may be undertaken despite—or perhaps because—the incoming
president would choose a different path. On occasion, an outgoing president’s actions have resulted in an incoming president bearing significant
political costs. For example, for his proposal to reverse the Clinton administration rule setting standards for arsenic in drinking water, President
George W. Bush was tarred in his first year as an “antienvironmentalist”
president.9
In a striking acknowledgment of the commonplace nature of this practice, the George W. Bush administration Office of Management and Budget director Joshua Bolten wrote agencies in May 2008, stating that “regulations to be finalized in this Administration should be proposed no later
than June 1, 2008, and final regulations should be issued no later than November 1, 2008.”10 That memorandum could be understood either as an
attempt to reduce late-term, lame-duck rulemaking or, more cynically, especially in view of the president’s poor poll numbers at the time,11 as a
message to agencies to get their controversial decisions finalized early.
Actions such as these have been widely criticized as an outgoing president’s last-chance grasp at power.12 The electorate has selected someone
new—very often of a different political party—to run the country. The
new president can appoint new members of the cabinet and new top agency
officials. The prospect of those changes has been associated with significant midnight rulemaking by the outgoing president’s administration. Indeed, one commentator has reported that the higher the level of turnover
4
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among top executive branch officials, the more “midnight regulations” are
likely to be issued.13
No one would, of course, want the government to effectively shut down
after the election. The sitting president continues to have the obligation to
execute the laws until the term ends on January 20. Nonetheless, an outgoing president’s use of the mechanisms of the administrative state to entrench particular policies or viewpoints that diverge from those preferred
by the newly elected president seems problematic at best. At worst, it could
be seen as a distasteful and antidemocratic power grab—an attempt to distribute rents, for example, or to set rights and obligations in the face of a
rare and important concerted expression of will from the electorate.
The point of this chapter, however, is to discuss the extent to which
these sorts of actions represent not just a potential cost to democracy, but
also an opportunity, in some cases, for our system of representative democracy to function better. In previous work, I have discussed the extent
to which midnight rulemaking can prompt greater attention to particular
presidential activities by the public. Greater public engagement, if it happens, can in turn prompt a decision by the new president that is better informed and more responsive to public preferences.
This chapter focuses on Congress, our most democratic federal institution. Congress is generally responsible for defining the authorities possessed by the administrative state, and congressional oversight is key to
holding agencies accountable for their actions. Midnight rulemaking also
has the potential to increase congressional engagement. Two commentators have recently argued that relative inattention from Congress can facilitate midnight rulemaking, because Congress may meet less frequently
during the lame duck period and there is no “repeat player” relationship
between the outgoing president and the Congress.14 To the contrary, however, Congress retains considerable formal power to respond to and override presidential decisions, whether during the transition period or later
on.15 To the extent there is a problem with congressional control over the
administrative state, it is a more general one—whether Congress is sufficiently engaged to react to agency actions that veer too far from public
concerns or preferences.
I want to suggest that midnight rulemaking can present a special opportunity to create an interbranch dialogue about the appropriate direction of
the administrative state. Midnight rulemaking actions have been relatively
high profile and controversial. As a consequence, they have prompted heightened public discussion. This in turn can generate greater attention in Con-
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gress and an interbranch dialogue regarding agency actions. In short, midnight rulemaking may on occasion ironically prompt a more deliberative,
and ultimately a more democratic, decision-making process.

II. The Administrative State, the President, and Congress
In the setting of federal statutes ranging from environmental and banking regulation to housing subsidies, the administrative state possesses substantial power to make binding standards, resolve disputes, and implement
programs. In so doing, agencies decide important questions of policy. Those
policy questions can implicate technical issues: how much wearing a seatbelt would reduce risk to an automobile or airplane passenger, for example.
But agencies also may resolve critical value questions: for example, how
much government should protect people from their own bad decisions;
how much risk society should tolerate; or which risks government should
first seek to address. That agencies must often resolve these issues raises
a question: how can we best assure that agencies are properly accountable
and that their decisions appropriately respond to public views?
It is no longer plausible—if it ever was—to say that agencies are merely
the “transmission belt” for critical policy decisions made, in statutes, by
Congress.16 A bureaucracy that implements a fairly vague statutory delegation may well take an action different from that envisioned by the legislative coalition enacting the statute.17 This sort of “bureaucratic drift”
alone may not be entirely problematic. One might interpret broad statutory language as incorporating an expectation by the enacting coalition that
administrative implementers will flexibly apply the statute to meet the country’s changing needs. Indeed, one of the claimed benefits of the administrative state over Congress is that the administrative state is more flexible
and able to adapt to changing circumstances. For example, Congress’s
1938 delegation to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, to regulate substances qualifying as
“drugs,” together with a long list of medications Congress itself identified
at the time, reflects Congress’s recognition of ongoing active scientific research into new medications and its wish that the FDA be able to flexibly respond to regulate new substances that Congress was unaware of
in 1938.18 Similarly, Congress’s direction to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate polluting discharges to the water by reference
to the “best available technology” is meant to allow the agency to continue
to increase the stringency of effluent limits as technology improves.19
As agencies address less technical and more value-laden concerns, how-
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ever, “bureaucratic drift” may become more problematic. If the EPA is
supposed to regulate pollutants to “protect the environment,” just how much
protection is appropriate? Do we protect the environment with no regard
to cost or to other social priorities? Again, Congress may not resolve these
questions in authorizing legislation and instead may leave the issues up
to the agency. This presents a dilemma, since deciding how much risk or
benefit is appropriate implicates not only available technology and scientific understanding of risk, but also social notions of the role of government, the proper allocation of social resources, and our collective tolerance
of certain sorts of risks.
Nonetheless, built into statutory delegations to agencies is often the
power—even the responsibility—to resolve these sorts of questions. How
can the extensive power to decide questions of value that is exercised by
the (unelected) administrative state be justified as legitimate governmental
authority?
A central part of the legitimacy assessment depends on the extent to
which an agency decision—a decision rendered by unelected officials—
can be characterized not only as compliant with the law and nonarbitrary,
but as democratically responsive. It is worth a moment to more clearly
specify the term “democratic.” Under a pluralist notion of democracy, government decisions may be considered democratic to the extent they aggregate and reflect preferences held by the public at large. Assuming that
the public possesses coherent, formed preferences, the critical question for
evaluating the “democratic” quality of an institution is the effectiveness
of the means for communicating public preferences and the institution’s
incentives to pay heed to those preferences. In the case of Congress and
the presidency, the elections and related processes (such as polling) might
serve both functions. In the setting of agency decision making, agencies,
as institutions accountable to the president and to Congress, also have an
incentive to learn and to respond appropriately to public preferences. Beyond this, agencies may be able to collect information on public preferences directly, through the notice-and-comment process for rulemaking.
Political supervision of the agencies, as well as judicial review, may provide
agencies with an incentive to respond appropriately to those preferences.
Alternatively, we might adopt a deliberative notion of democracy, where
a democratic dialogue helps establish the proper direction for society. A
particular institution’s decision might be viewed as democratic to the extent the institution facilitates deliberation and reasoned, public justifications are offered for its proposed decisions. Not only can the process of
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deliberation offer an opportunity for people to change one another’s preferences and reach a socially regarding outcome through reasoning, but it
can also develop civic virtue in the participants.20 Effective representation
of an appropriate array of viewpoints is key to such a dialogue.21 A national electoral process might be conceived of as deliberative, for example.
With respect to agencies, again, they might be deemed democratic under a
deliberative view because they are accountable to and responsive to democratically deliberative institutions. Even without these mechanisms, agencies engaging in rulemaking may qualify as democratically deliberative because they are required to collect public comment and give reasons (subject
to judicial review) for rejecting significant comments.22
Currently, in view of the relatively unconstrained statutory delegations
to agencies, administrative law scholarship places a great deal of emphasis
on presidential control as a source of democratic legitimacy for the actions of the administrative state.23 The president can convey the electorate’s views on such matters as the role of government and the most significant health and safety concerns. He or she possesses the power to appoint
and remove the heads of executive agencies at will, and it is generally accepted that statutes delegating authority to agencies contemplate at least
some presidential supervision.24 Since the Reagan administration, executive branch agencies have been required by executive order to submit significant draft proposed and final rules to the White House Office of Management and Budget for prepublication approval. The president thus is in
a position to oversee the activities of the entire executive branch and to coordinate agency actions.
Jerry Mashaw has argued that presidential control over an executive
branch agency may better assure democratic responsiveness than the agency’s close accountability to Congress. Beyond the coordination function,
the claim is that the president may be a better conduit for public preferences than Congress because he or she is chosen through a national election.
This will prompt that president to take a more national viewpoint; he or
she will not be in thrall to either narrowly regional interests or the demands of small constituent groups.25 Members of Congress focused on reelection, by comparison, may concentrate too heavily on distributing pork to
narrow interest groups or home state or home community constituents.26
As recent scholarship has explored, however, this is an unduly rosy picture of the president’s electoral incentives. For a number of reasons, the
presidential election may not effectively communicate voter preferences.
Voters pay little attention to electoral issues. Voter turnout in presiden-
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tial elections, though far higher than other elections, is low. It has not exceeded 60 percent of registered voters since the 1960s. Even if voters pay
attention to electoral issues and participate in the presidential election,
they have highly limited choices by the time of the general election. A
voter generally must choose between two candidates, each of whom represents a package of policy views that probably does not correspond very
well to the voter’s own preferences. Further, as Cynthia Farina has argued,
a voter may often cast a vote incorrectly in the sense of misunderstanding,
in a basic way, the chosen candidate’s stance on an issue important to the
voter.27 Meanwhile, although the president must win reelection in a national election, the structure of the electoral college results in presidential
priorities being focused particularly on swing states and even on particular
communities in swing states.28 Finally, voter preferences are very often not
well formed. On a wide array of issues, voter views may be inchoate at the
time of an election, leaving the president with no possibility of a mandate
or even a clear sense of national preferences on a given issue.29 In short,
the presidential election may only imperfectly transmit the views of the
national electorate, and the president may have strong incentives to respond to small subgroups within that electorate. That will in turn impair
the president’s ability to transmit public preferences to the administrative
state. Accordingly, as Anne O’Connell has suggested, “administrative law
needs to attend more to Congress.”30
Congress can, of course, define or redefine the terms of an agency’s
delegation by modifying an agency’s authorizing statute by new legislation. Further, Congress has other well-established means of influencing
the administrative state short of passing or modifying authorizing legislation. Congress can define the size of an agency’s budget or pass specific
legislation, such as through appropriations riders, that directs the agency
to take (or not take) particular actions. With respect to agency decisions
in particular, Congress has created the special tool of the Congressional
Review Act, a tool for expedited passage of legislation that overrides particular agency actions. Admittedly, the potential of that act has not been
fully realized, as it has been used only once and its use seriously threatened only one other time.31 Less formally, Congress can conduct oversight,
seeking an agency official’s explanation of reasons for a particular decision,32
or send less formal messages to an agency, such as through discussion at a
confirmation hearing, in language contained in a committee report or conference committee report, or through floor statements.
Through these activities, Congress can communicate policy preferences
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to the agencies, and Congress may be able to transmit and engage a wider
and more representative set of public views than the president. First, Congress is, of course, a regional institution, the members of which are elected
by state or by district. By dint of the electoral process, five hundred thirtyfive members of Congress are more likely than the president to represent
a wide range of public views and to capture regionally distinctive views.33
While Mashaw may be correct to accept the assumption that the ability to
“bring home the bacon” to local constituents plays more of a role in congressional elections than it does in presidential elections, so that “the congressperson’s position on various issues of national interest is of modest”
importance,34 a growing number of legislators have been elected from “ideologically homogenous constituencies,” leaving them more “discretion to
pursue their own preferred policy goals,” rather than bacon-bringing.35 Variation in local interests and values is less likely to be overlooked in congressional elections than in the presidential election. And the presidential
election is not free from the pressures to deliver special benefits either—
it is just that the pressures primarily relate to areas in which the vote may
swing.36 In sum, views held by a significant portion of the population are
likely to receive at least some active representation through the congressional election process, and possibly greater representation than through
the presidential election process.
As with the presidential election process, there are limits here, too. Because many members of Congress are elected from so-called safe districts,
a change in voter views or values may not always correspond to a change
in the identity of any particular representative or senator. Even in a district
that is not a “safe” one, a voter’s choice among congressional candidates,
as with presidential candidates, represents a choice among two bundles of
preferences, neither of which is likely to perfectly correspond to the voter’s
preferences. Nonetheless, the congressional election process seems likely
to result in a range of views, particularly district and state views, being expressed among the collection of individuals that compose the House and
Senate.
Consider, in addition, that voter views on particular topics may be illformed at the time of an election. Assuming this is the case, looking simply
at electoral incentives to detect and transmit public views seems an unsatisfactory way to assess an institution’s democratic responsiveness or to assess whether an institution has a “sense of the popular will” More critically,
we should consider the institution’s ability to conduct meaningful deliberation and to engage a wide range of views. On this deliberative view of
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democracy, an institution has a claim to democratic legitimacy when its
process is participatory and deliberative, and proposed decisions are justified with publicly articulated reasons.37
Here, Congressional deliberation may have the advantage over presidential deliberation because it is likely to engage a wider range of views
and preferences. The president may well deliberate with his or her staff
and with groups with whom he or she meets—and members of Congress
can do this too—but the president, not the voters, selects the administration’s cabinet and staff members. The president can choose whether to attempt to make those individuals representative of a wide range of public
views or whether to have advisors whose views, for the most part, mirror
his or her own. Moreover, the president can decide whether to make that
debate public. For the most part, internal White House debates on regulatory policy have remained opaque to the public eye.38 By contrast, congressional deliberation often takes place through public statements, as members of Congress articulate the reasons for their positions.39
Finally, compared with an agency, congressional deliberation also is
likely to be more “democratic” because the discussants are more representative. Even though agencies must respond to significant comments they
receive in rulemaking, it is unclear that groups participating in a rulemaking process are likely to be any more representative than those transmitting information to Congress or to the president. Second, agencies may be
biased toward well-organized and more narrowly focused interest groups,
particularly those groups representing regulated entities.40 Such groups are
likely to more effectively transmit their views in the rulemaking process.
Wholly apart from the question of whether agencies might be captured
by those they regulate, they are acquainted with those groups, have a longterm incentive to understand the information transmitted by regulated
entities, and seek to obtain their compliance. All this can prompt agencies to pay particular attention to the views of regulated entities.41 Third,
comments submitted may well focus more on technical questions than
on value-laden questions. Finally, even if values-focused comments are
submitted, the incentives for the agency decision maker to decide valueladen questions in a democratically responsive way are limited.42 Presidential supervision may prompt an agency official to choose a policy that
is responsive to the president’s views—and if the president is electorally
responsive, ultimately to public views. Congressional supervision, if it is
present, may create similar incentives. Otherwise, if the agency official
is a well-intentioned, public-interested official,43 the president may inde-
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pendently seek to implement a policy that is democratically responsive, in
the sense of responding thoughtfully and fairly to value-laden views expressed in the administrative process. In short, though, the incentives for
an agency decision to be “democratic” in nature largely collapse down to
those faced by the president and Congress, except that the agency may
have a more formalized means for collecting information from the public
at large. Apart from supervision by the president or Congress or a sense
of personal obligation, there is no particular direct incentive for the agency
official to be democratically responsive.44
Moreover, compared with agency deliberation, a congressional debate
potentially can be more visible and more transparent. Even certain submajority debates within Congress, such as the committee hearing and the
floor debate in one house, may still amount to a more public deliberative
discussion than that available within the executive branch. While some
deliberative discussion likely does take place within the executive branch,
its benefits are undermined by a general lack of transparency.45 Citizens
hearing reports of a congressional debate on a topic of interest are more
likely to perceive that their viewpoints are receiving actual representation
and view the outcome as more legitimate.46
Needless to say, congressional deliberation may not always be public
or necessarily superior to presidential deliberation or agency deliberation.
Nor, if only one “best” institution could be selected to oversee agency decision, is it a foregone conclusion that Congress would be the institution. And
at the time of this writing, the level of public confidence in Congress—as
with the government at large—was at a quarter-century low.47 Nonetheless, because Congress is a valuable forum for the airing of public views,
congressional debate, even by a submajority, clearly is—and ought to be—an
important source of information and guidance for agencies as they implement their statutes.
These arguments are, of course, strongest when the entire Congress is
involved—or has the opportunity to be involved—in the passage of legislation. Constitutional bicameralism and presentment requirements and
Senate and House rules make it likely that legislation, a concerted expression of congressional will, will be passed only after significant deliberation
or opportunity for deliberation. Beyond this, however, even some views articulated by a submajority of Congress—and not even in the process of enacting legislation—can be valuable for agencies. While deliberation by a
submajority is inferior to deliberation by the entire Congress, such statements could contribute importantly to an agency decision-making process
on public preferences or policy matters. Again, I mean to focus upon the
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less formal discussions and articulations of views within Congress, whether
or not legislation results. For example, House or Senate committee members may discuss an agency action with a cabinet official at an oversight
hearing, or individual members of Congress may make floor statements.
Information transmitted by even a few members of Congress can be
highly valuable to a decision-making agency. As elected officials, members of Congress do have an incentive to understand and engage public
views, and they generally are likely to engage a wider range of policy issues
than agency officials. For a very basic example, the vast majority of congressional committees have jurisdiction over more than one federal agency.
Committee service alone, then, can provide a member of Congress with a
comparatively broad perspective.
Concern might be expressed that congressional statements, particularly
informal ones, might be unreliable. Gersen and Posner have suggested,
for example, that informal statements—anything less than a one-house
or concurrent resolution—may not fairly indicate a member of Congress’s
preferences for legislation.48 Member statements of use to agencies, however, include those that convey information regarding the workability or
consequences of a particular regulatory approach or on public preferences
with respect to a particular topic.49 Despite Gersen and Posner’s arguments
that speeches are “cheap talk” consuming few resources,50 these congressional statements are likely to be reliable. First, an elected official typically
has a substantial investment in his or her reputation. For example, a reputation for fairness and commitment to a policy stance can be connected
not only to electoral success, but to a legislator’s success in advancing socially desirable policies.51 Similarly, a reputation for reliability and consistency generally will enhance a legislator’s ability to obtain campaign contributions.52 The value of a reputation for reliable statements obviously
increases with the chances of “repeat play.” Legislators will have repeat
play with other legislators with whom they wish to collaborate or whose
support they wish to obtain for legislative measures, with voters in their
district or state, with agencies, and with interest groups who are deciding
whether to make campaign contributions. Not only do legislators already
function in institutions with substantial repeat play opportunities, recent
political science scholarship suggests that the committee system may in
part be explained by the fact that it keeps the opportunities for repeated
play high, so that an individual legislator can obtain confirmation of a
reputation for reliability and “collect” on the benefits of that reliability.53
Finally, a congressional statement that is public, particularly one made in
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an active debate, will be more costly if unreliable because the statement
can be more easily monitored by interest groups, voters, and colleagues.
Congress cannot, of course, encourage agencies to violate existing law,
both because agencies are bound by the law and because Congress is constrained to follow only constitutionally prescribed means of enacting legislation.54 And any formal action vetoing an agency’s decision or limiting its
options must, of course, be done through the constitutionally prescribed
mechanisms.55 Further, Congress and its members are barred from executing the laws.56 But these statements are made in the context of broad
and constitutional delegations of administrative authority.57 Broad statutes are widely perceived to evince an expectation on the part of the enacting Congress that the agency’s application of particular laws will evolve
with time. Application may evolve to take account of changed scientific
circumstances, but also changed social circumstances, including views of
the role of government. If an agency’s application of a statute is to evolve
in accordance with changed social circumstances, then information from
congressional discussion must—along with information gathered from
the public and from executive officials—be seen as a useful source to an
agency seeking to detect those changed social circumstances.
The biggest difficulty with Congress supplying public values information to the agencies is simply that Congress is insufficiently engaged. As
is widely recognized, its attention to the work of agencies is at best sporadic.58 As Matt McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have famously observed with respect to oversight of the administrative state, Congress may
function less like a police patrol and more like a fire department triggered
by an individual or interest group’s pulling of an alarm.59 One implication is that Congress will try to redirect an administrative agency heading down the wrong path only if (presumably well-organized) individuals
and interest groups ask it to do so.60 Congress may thus inadequately police an agency when the agency misapprehends democratic values that are
held more widely and more diffusely.
Further, congressional deliberation, even at its most active, could also be
criticized. For example, the committee structure, set up to develop expertise in a wide variety of specialized subjects,61 may end up instead disproportionately rewarding well-organized interest groups.62 Richard Lazarus
has noted the extent to which changes in congressional structure have reduced effective deliberation on environmental issues.63 The incentives created by the Budget Act to refocus congressional deliberations on appropriations, rather than authorizing legislation, have prompted a decline in
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the specialized, knowledgeable authorizing committees and an increase in
oversight being conducted by appropriations committees, often smaller,
less well-staffed, less-specialized committees.64 Even where authorizing
committees exercise oversight, the committee may not be representative
of Congress as a whole. Such oversight may represent another bite at the
apple for interest groups who lost in the administrative process.65
In short, as it currently stands, congressional oversight of agencies can
offer important information to agencies, but oversight is generally sporadic and when it does take place, it can be at the behest of well-organized
interest groups.

III. Midnight Rulemaking and Congress: Two Examples
So what about midnight rulemaking and democracy? Midnight rulemaking is primarily criticized as antidemocratic because it takes place postelection—and thus in the face of the electorate’s expressed preferences.
As Jack Beermann and I have both discussed, midnight rulemaking may
be motivated by the need to keep the government going, the desire to finish longtime projects before a deadline, and the goal of avoiding the delays that can come from bringing a new team up to speed. Less attractively,
some midnight rules and other actions can be motivated by the desire to
entrench policies that a new president would not otherwise select or even
to impose political costs on a new president, should that new president
wish to choose a different option.66
In some instances, however, midnight rulemaking may have the potential to enhance democratic processes by prompting greater congressional
engagement. Take a pair of examples from the most recent presidential
transition. In mid-December 2008, the Department of the Interior’s Fish
and Wildlife Service finalized a new rule regarding the obligations of federal agencies to consult with the Service prior to taking an action that
might affect endangered species.67 Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act requires federal agencies considering permit or license applications or
authorizing or funding some other sort of action to consult first with a socalled wildlife agency—the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS)
or the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)—if the action could “jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat
of such species.”68 Under regulations in effect prior to December 2008, if
the permitting agency determined that the proposed action is not likely
to adversely affect a listed species or habitat and the NMFS or FWS concurred, the statutory obligation to protect the species would be met. The
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new regulations exempted agencies from having to consult if the agency
itself determined the action would not affect a listed species and the effects
of the action would be manifested through “global processes” or would be
difficult to measure.
The practical effect was that in many cases the permitting agency—often
an agency with no particular expertise in endangered species or habitat—
could unilaterally determine the appropriateness of its action under the
Endangered Species Act. Most controversially, perhaps, was the exception for “global processes,” which was targeted at project-related climate
change impacts and represented a judgment that the Endangered Species Act should not be a means of dealing with climate change. Again, for
potential effects evinced through global processes, the permitting agency
could be the final authority on whether its action was appropriate under
the Endangered Species Act. The rule received significant public attention, and the agency received many comments; a high percentage of those
comments consisted of form letters submitted by the public at large.69
At around the same time, the administration finalized a special rule
addressing the polar bear’s status as a listed threatened species. The earlier listing of the polar bear as “threatened” triggered statutory requirements that agencies consult with the Interior Department regarding any
federal action, including permitting or licensing, that could jeopardize
the species or negatively affect its habitat. Typically, designation of a species as “threatened” would also be associated with a regulatory decision
prohibiting at least some “takes” of the species, including indirect harm
through habitat destruction.70 The special rule, however, specified that
any activity occurring outside of the current range of the species, even
if it would have a significant effect on polar bears or bear habitat, such
as through emission of greenhouse gases connected with the melting of
arctic ice, would not be deemed a prohibited act under the Endangered
Species Act.71
Prior to this time, neither of these issues had received sustained attention either in the media or in Congress. References in the popular media
to the Endangered Species Act or to the issues raised by these rules in the
year previous to the rules’ issuance were occasional at best, and mentions in
Congress were almost nonexistent. Members of Congress did occasionally
refer to the polar bear, but generally with respect to other issues, such as
the status of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Similarly, the relationship of endangered species protections to global climate change policy received no focused public attention during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Once the rules were issued, however, they attracted immediate con-
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gressional attention. Shortly after they were issued, Congressman Markey mentioned both the consultation and polar bear rules at a hearing on
“midnight” regulations.72 When it was introduced in February 2009, the
House Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (with appropriations for the
Interior Department, the EPA, and a large number of other agencies) contained a rider relating to these two rules. Section 429 of the introduced
bill gave the Interior and Commerce Departments sixty days to summarily
withdraw the two ESA rules and reinstate the rules previously in effect.
In the Senate, however, Senator Murkowski and three colleagues offered an amendment to delete the rider, so that any repeal of the ESA
rules would be subject to the usual notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. This prompted debate among several members of the Senate
on the substantive merits of the rules. With respect to the polar bear rule,
Murkowski and others argued in favor of maintaining administrative procedures for repeal of the rules, since without the special rule for the polar
bear, there could be “lawsuits to stop any action that would increase carbon dioxide or any greenhouse gas emissions anywhere in the country . . .
if the project had not first consulted with U.S. Fish and Wildlife on potential impacts.” Murkowski further suggested that using the endangered
species listing as a way to “regulate greenhouse gas emissions” would be
“overreaching,” potentially triggering “such a backlash that it harms support for the Endangered Species Act.”73
Senator Feinstein and others called the consultation rule “wrongheaded”
because it would leave species-related decision making up to the acting
agency “without any input from scientists or biologists.”74 Senator Boxer
noted that the rules were “midnight regulations” and “capricious.”75 The
Murkowski amendment failed and the rider remained in the bill.
After the presidential transition, eight senators, including Senators Durbin, Boxer, and Kerry, wrote Interior Secretary Salazar in April 2009 urging Salazar to use the authority granted in the appropriations bill to summarily reverse the polar bear and consultation rules so that the Interior
Department would continue to retain the ability to “consider[] and address[] the very factors that are causing the ice to melt [and the decline of
the polar bear], including climate change.”76 Forty-four members of the
House wrote a similar letter regarding the consultation rule, though not
the polar bear rule.77 The possibility of reversal of the midnight rules also
energized twenty conservation and environmental groups, who wrote the
Interior Department separately to encourage it to use its authority to reverse both ESA rules. (The Center for Biological Diversity sent a petition
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with nearly 50,000 signatures as well.) The transition period was marked
by significant news coverage, both of the late-term Bush administration
rules,79 of congressional debate,80 and of the Obama administration’s reactions.
The Obama administration reversed the consultation rule shortly after
the passage of the appropriations legislation. Rather than simply reinstating the status quo ante, however, the agency said this: “We believe that it
is appropriate to withdraw the new regulations and return to the status quo
ante pending a comprehensive review of the ESA section 7 consultation
regulations. Recognizing the widespread public concern about the process
in the promulgation of the new regulations, the Departments agree that
a thoughtful, in-depth, and measured review would be beneficial before a
determination is made regarding potential changes to the section 7 consultation regulations. The section 7 consultation process is important for
the conservation of species and critical habitat and involves complex and
highly technical issues; the input from career conservation biologists who
have experience with the section 7 consultations and who can provide scientific and technical expertise should, of course, be a key part of the process. In addition, any rulemaking process should be accorded a sufficient
period of time to provide for careful, meaningful involvement of the affected public and to ensure consistency with the purposes of the ESA.
This thorough review will allow the Departments to identify a range of
options and implement improvements, if appropriate.”81 The formal statement from the agencies—their publication in the Federal Register of the
decision to revoke the rule—is opaque regarding potential political influences on the decision. Indeed, the agencies describe the decision as solely
their own, although evidence elsewhere suggests that the White House
Office of Management and Budget obtained some changes in the rule before its final publication.82
The polar bear rule ended up on a different track, however. Initial indications were that the Obama administration sought an easy reversal of
this rule as well. Federal law requires the president to submit a comprehensive federal budget on or before the first Monday in February, and that
submission typically begins the congressional budget process.83 It accordingly could have been the Obama administration that suggested the rider
in the first place. Moreover, the same interest groups hopeful of reinstating the earlier version of the consultation rule also lobbied heavily on the
polar bear rule.84
Despite its likely initial position, however, the Obama administration
78
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ultimately decided to retain the polar bear rule. The Interior Department
published no statement in the Federal Register, as it was leaving the Bush
administration rule in place. However, Secretary Salazar did make a statement that the rule would be retained. Salazar acknowledged that greenhouse gases threaten the polar bear, but stated that “the global risk from
greenhouse gases . . . requires comprehensive policies, not a patchwork of
agency actions carried out for particular species. ‘It would be very difficult
for our scientists to be doing evaluations of a cement plant in Georgia or
Florida and the impact it’s going to have on the polar bear habitat.’ ”85
Based solely on the written record, it is very difficult to know conclusively which influences led the Interior and Commerce Departments to
take different paths on the consultation and polar bear rules. Nonetheless,
the change in approach to the polar bear rule, together with the fact that
the agencies took nearly all the time Congress allotted them to act, is very
suggestive that the agencies were reconsidering their original positions in
light of the public and congressional views expressed on the issue in early
2009.
In particular, the agency decisions appeared to be consistent with some
of the reasons offered in the congressional debate. With respect to the
consultation rule, senators participating in the debate on the Murkowski
amendment appeared neither to raise any specific objection to abandoning
the consultation rule nor to dispute Senator Feinstein’s point that consideration of the status of threatened or endangered species ought to be done
by trained scientists residing in the Interior and Commerce Departments.
By contrast, Murkowski and her colleagues supporting the amendment
to strike the rider nearly all focused on the virtues of the Bush administration’s polar bear rule and the difficulties of abandoning it. Namely, it
would be challenging to make an individual regulatory decision based on
the small incremental effect a project would have on greenhouse gases,
arctic ice, and in turn the polar bear. Meanwhile, Endangered Species
Act litigation could become a significant forum in which climate change
policy would be developed. This is not a scientific argument about whether
greenhouse gases affect the polar bears. Instead, it is an argument about
the best way to make policy decisions. Even though reducing greenhouse
gases and addressing climate change are clearly important goals, creating a veto on nationwide greenhouse-gas creating projects—or subjecting them to an Endangered Species Act permit to be issued by the Interior Department—would not only be impracticable but would not be an
appropriate means to develop global warming policy. Instead, as Secre-
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tary Salazar stated, a more comprehensive approach would be preferable
to a simple focus on a small project’s effect on polar bear habitat. Salazar’s
statement ended up picking up some of the most thoroughly argued points
in the congressional debate. While it is unclear exactly how many senators
supported one view or another on the polar bear rule, the agency decision
should be seen as more democratically responsive to the extent it was informed by the well-developed views expressed in the Senate and the open
debate on the question.86
Ultimately, the polar bear decision was met with approval from mainstream newspapers as well. For example, the Washington Post praised the
decision: “Interior Secretary Ken Salazar ruffled more than a few feathers
this month when he let stand a Bush administration decision to prohibit
the use of the Endangered Species Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. It was the right call when it was made in 2008, and it is the right
call now.”87 Despite declining to require any agency activity that might increase greenhouse gases to obtain a “take permit” prior to proceeding, the
Obama administration instead has increased the size of the polar bear’s
critical habitat.88 Agency activities within that habitat will remain subject
to consultation with the wildlife agencies.
In short, the Endangered Species Act example suggests an administration decision that changed over time, in light of public and congressional
engagement. The Obama administration decisions on both the consultation and the polar bear rule were likely better informed and more democratically deliberative than either the Bush administration’s rules of December 2008, or the position, implicit in the adopted appropriations rider,
that the two rules should be reconsidered with an option for summary
reversal.
The Bush administration “midnight rules” on endangered species and
the Obama administration’s desire to reverse them ultimately had the effect of engaging Congress and heightening public interest in the issues.
As I have written elsewhere, the identity of the president and his or her
agency heads, together with the content of a “midnight rule,” can not only
generate public interest in the rule, but also can supply important information about the range of regulatory options. For example, in its outgoing
months, the Clinton administration issued a rule known as the “roadless
rule,” restricting road building in national forests. The Clinton rule provided the public with a benchmark with which to evaluate other regulatory
options, such as those proposed by the George W. Bush administration.
Here, the endangered species rulemakings of the Bush administration
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similarly provided the public and Congress with an additional benchmark
against which to evaluate a range of policy options. The midnight rules
represented the outgoing administration’s analysis and preferred policy regarding how to administer the Endangered Species Act and what protections to afford the threatened polar bear. The timing of the rule prompted
debate in Congress, but it also provided a concrete proposal which members of Congress could react to and discuss. That process of congressional
debate prompted better informed and more democratically deliberative
final decisions than if the Bush administration had done nothing on these
issues and left it all up to the Obama administration.
Not only might the midnight rulemaking have had benefits for the ultimate agency decision, but we might also see it as encouraging better
congressional functioning. As McCubbins and Schwartz have suggested,
Congress usually acts in a “fire-alarm” mode. The primary criticism of firealarm functioning is that the congressional agenda is limited and that fire
alarms are pulled by organized interest groups.89 By contrast, in the midnight rulemaking setting, members of Congress may already be attuned
to the activities of the outgoing president, and the fire alarm is effectively
pulled by the fact that the outgoing president has placed the issue on the
agenda.
Again, consider the endangered species rules. These issues did not receive significant congressional attention during the year prior to the issuance of the rules, apart from scattered statements in the Congressional
Record on other issues.90 The Congressional Record contains no discussion
of any sort regarding whether acting agencies should be required to consult with the Interior and Commerce Departments prior to taking action
that could negatively impact endangered species. The issuance of the rules,
however, caused a number of senators to join issue and debate the relevant
policy questions.
This is an improvement to the usual fire alarm pulling. The rule has
been placed on the agenda by an outgoing president rather than, say, an
organized interest group. A midnight rule can highlight the space between
the outgoing and incoming president’s views. That space, once identified
by the outgoing president’s concrete action, provides an opportunity for
constructive engagement. Especially because issue may not have been joined
during the presidential election, these sorts of issues can be particularly
valuable ones for congressional debate.
A significant concern might be that it is a lame-duck president who is
selecting these topics to engage the attention of the public and of Con-
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gress, arguably displacing the new president’s political agenda and sometimes yielding to a temptation to distribute rents as well as to make policy
serving the outgoing president’s view of the public interest.91 Further, a
deluge of midnight regulations could overwhelm both Congress and the
incoming president, and many such rules might stay in place simply because too many resources, both fiscal and political, would be required to revise or repeal them. But rules that make good policy in the eye of the departing president may prompt genuine political discussion, because they
also likely possess support from a significant portion of the political community. In the setting of the Endangered Species Act midnight rules, the
result was a debate that otherwise would not have taken place. Even if it
might be characterized as an outgoing president’s late-term power grab,
then, teeing up an issue for public debate through a midnight rule may ultimately be more democracy enhancing than no action at all.

IV. Conclusion
None of this is to say that midnight rulemaking is always a good thing—
or even that it is, overall, the best way to prompt congressional debate or
renewed congressional attention to the actions of the administrative state.
Nonetheless, we can learn something from the productive and valuable debate midnight rules sometimes engender. Public views on particular issues
may not be fully crystallized at the time an incoming president is elected.
Congress may not have focused—or have been made to focus—upon particular policy issues. A silver lining of the midnight rule may be that it
prompts more direct and concentrated congressional engagement on particular policy issues. That has the potential to improve both the agency
decision ultimately made by the new president and congressional deliberation itself. A critical lesson we should take away is the value of congressional discussion for agency action and the need for innovative ways
to better engage Congress in difficult, value-laden issues handled by the
administrative state. It revised the rule at the end of 2011.
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